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Abstract. Based on the SKY micro health insurance project that GRET has been developing in Cambodia for ten 
years, this article relects on how non-proit private micro health insurance can help improve public health care.
The medical situation in Cambodia is particularly interesting to study insomuch as the population multiplies 
their sources of care (self-medication, visits to private practitioners, traditional therapists, doctors in public 
facilities, etc.), which leads to high costs and mediocre care.
Using the SKY project’s internal database and four qualitative studies conducted between 2007 and 2008 in the 
project’s areas of intervention, we show that the SKY project, which is conducted in agreement with the Khmer 
authorities, has enabled greater utilisation of public health care, a better perception of the quality of care, and a 
better capacity for inancial anticipation both in health care facilities and among the insured. 
Nevertheless, the limitations of and obstacles facing such systems are numerous: self-medication among the 
insured persists, the attitude of poorly paid health care workers does not favour rational use of medicines, and 
the orientation of Ministerial inancing of health care is not always consistent with the project’s objectives. 
Ultimately, the synergies between non proit private micro health insurance and public health care will be all the 
more effective when insurance accounts for a large share of health care facilities’ revenues – that is to say when 
the subscriber base is large.
Keywords. Health insurance, Cambodia, public health, health care, economics, Khmer.
1 Introduction 
In Cambodia, the successive conlicts in the 1970s and 
1980s (the Vietnamese invasion and especially the Khmer 
Rouge period) left the country battered at the start of the 
1990s, with considerably less trained and educated human 
capital (Lefait, 2005). The relative political stability since 
1997 has allowed some economic and social indicators to 
improve. In 2004, the human development index (HDI) 
was 0.58, compared to 0.51 in 1990 (1 being the maximum 
possible). Despite this improvement, poverty is still wide-
spread and Cambodia is one of the most needy countries in 
Southeast Asia. Its per capita GNP is currently approxi-
mately 350 US dollars according to the World Bank 
Poverty Assessment Report (2006).
Correspondence to: Aurore Duffau
(duffau@gret.org) 
Table 1. Primary demographic and health statistics for Cambodia
Population: 14  million. WHO 2005
Birth Rate: 26.9‰. CIA 2006 (estimate)
Under-5 Mortality: 141‰. UNDP 2004
Infant Mortality: 97‰. UNDP 2004
Maternal Mortality: 4.4‰. UNDP 1990 - 2004
Life Expectancy: 58 years (women), 51 years (men). WHO 2005
Fertility Rate: 3.4 births per woman. Health Survey 2005
Access to a Source of Drinking Water: 41%. UNDP 2004
Population Under the Poverty Line: 35%. World Bank 2004
HDI Ranking: 129 / 177. UNDP 2004
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 This economic and social situation has heavy consequenc-
es in the ield of health. Today, two health care systems co-
exist in Cambodia:
– An under-utilised public sector that offers poor quality 
care at high real prices (oficial fees plus unoficial ad-
ditional charges). This concerns three levels of inter-
vention in Cambodia: the community health centres, 
the operational district referral hospitals, and the pro-
vincial hospitals.
– An unregulated and growing private sector, primarily 
in urban areas, that offers somewhat irrational (notably 
over-medicated) care at very high prices. This sector is 
made up of private physicians, private drug sellers 
(with or without pharmaceutical training), and tradi-
tional therapists.
Overall, one can speak of the inappropriate use of both pri-
vate and public sectors, with considerable self-medication, 
multiple consultations, and seeking care late. As a result of 
the suppression of the modern health care system during the 
Khmer Rouge period, self-medication is a widespread phe-
nomenon in Cambodia. In the vast majority of cases, the pa-
tients’ irst recourse is to buy medications directly, without 
consulting a health care provider. If their health does not im-
prove, then they consult a private physician, and turn to the 
public facilities only as a last resort. At the same time, they 
sometimes also consult a traditional healer in an attempt to 
increase their chances of recovery. Thus, the public health 
care system is under-utilised. Less than one-quarter (21%) of 
people seeking care turn to public facilities irst (National In-
stitute of Public Health and National Institute of Statistics 
Cambodia, 2006). This percentage is even lower for second 
and third consultations.
The principal criticisms of the public sector are its geo-
graphical distance (compared to private practitioners who 
make house calls) and the cost of the transportation involved, 
staff that is barely present, very limited opening hours, medi-
cation frequently out of stock, highly variable costs, and a 
lack of respect for patients (Annear et al., 2006).
The government of Cambodia has not been inactive in re-
sponse to this situation. The result of a reform process, the 
Health Financing Charter introduced cost recovery in 1996. 
The purpose of introducing an oficial fee scale was to elimi-
nate parallel payments for care by users and allow health care 
workers to be better paid. However, institutional constraints 
(centralised staff management, limited veriication and sanc-
tion capacity) did not allow the hoped-for results to be at-
tained. In addition, drug shortages have forced most health 
care centres to devote some of their revenue to additional 
purchases.
Later, the Cambodian government made a genuine effort to 
formulate a national health policy that resulted in the deini-
tion of a “Masterplan for Social Health Insurance” in 2005 
(Cambodia Ministry of Health, 2005). Nevertheless, while 
the country’s primary care coverage has undoubtedly im-
proved, one can note that the government’s efforts focused 
mainly on developing health infrastructure and on training 
courses, more than on any signiicant improvement in access 
to care.
Indeed, health care inancing is still one of the main stum-
bling blocks in the system. Currently, the government inanc-
es only 25% of today’s total health budget and donors are 
estimated to inance 10%. The remainder is inanced by us-
ers, which represents a very high cost for households, partic-
ularly in rural areas (approximately US$18 per person per 
year). Despite the reform, users continue to snub the public 
sector, which is seen as being poor quality and not having 
clear-cut fees. The consequence of the inancing dificulties is 
that health care workers in the public sector are still paid too 
little. As a result, staff members show high absenteeism, a 
lack of motivation, and recourse to parallel private practices. 
Government supervision of the system is still weak.
Since 2002, the Ministry of Health has shown an increas-
ingly strong interest in the subject of health insurance in 
Cambodia and its possible contributions to the direct inanc-
ing of health care by users, as can be seen in its 2003-2007 
and 2008-2015 Action Plans (Cambodia Ministry of Health, 
2008). In 2005, an Inter-Ministerial Committee prepared a 
directive on the establishment of health insurance schemes in 
Cambodia. Finally, a Ministry of Finances decree is being 
prepared to ensure regulation of the micro-insurance sector.
Since the government of Cambodia recognises the poten-
tial interest of micro health insurance in ensuring diversiied 
inancing of health care, it seems legitimate to ask to what 
extent private micro health insurance can help improve pub-
lic health care. While much has been written about micro 
health insurance and about public sector health care in Cam-
bodia (Bigdeli, 2007; Levine, Gardner, 2008), little has yet be 
published on the links between micro health insurance and 
public health care. Our article aims to address this gap. 
After presenting the project methodology and the research 
methods used, we will show which project system was set up 
locally to coordinate micro health insurance and public health 
care, and what impact the implementation of this programme 
has had. We will then discuss the limitations of the work ac-
complished and the theoretical and practical lessons that can 
be learnt. Finally, we will conclude with the prospects for 
developing this type of approach.
2 PROJECT METHODOLOGY,  
 RESEARCH METHODS 
2.1 Project Methodology
The SKY1 micro health insurance programme was launched 
by GRET (the Research and Technological Exchange Group, a 
French NGO) in Kandal Province, Cambodia, in 1998. The 
project initially took an experimental approach because of the 
lack of references on micro health insurance in Cambodia, and 
then slowly stabilised its intervention methodology. Today, it 
covers more than 40,000 people in eight operational districts 
in urban and rural areas (see Appendix for a map), making it 
the largest community-based health insurance scheme in the 
country. SKY’s objective for the next four years is to cover all 
of Takeo Province and spread to Phnom Penh in order to assess 
the sustainability of its system and the potential for inancial 
 1SKY is an acronym for “health for our families” in Khmer.
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cross-subsidisation between urban and rural insurance schemes 
and between formal and informal populations. 
SKY offers “irst dollar coverage,” meaning subscribers are 
covered from the irst dollar spent on care. It covers both pri-
mary health care at health centres and hospital care at hospitals 
with which SKY has agreements. Coverage also includes free 
emergency transportation between Health Centres and hospi-
tals, a funeral grant and, depending on the contributors’ wish, 
traditional music for funerals. There is no limit to the number 
of visits or cost of services to which subscribers have access. 
Coverage is not offered for chronic diseases such as TB and 
HIV/AIDS2 (though care and treatment of opportunistic dis-
eases are covered), plastic surgery, dental care and glasses. 
Membership is voluntary, family-based and on a monthly ba-
sis. Premium varies according to four family size brackets, 
from US$11,70 per person and per year for a single person to 
US$3,57 per person and per year for large families. SKY 
works in partnership with public health facilities using a “cap-
itation” scheme at Health Centres and Operational District Re-
ferral Hospitals, and a third party payment scheme at provin-
cial hospitals. This system is detailed below (see III.1.2).
As the regulatory framework for health insurance is current-
ly being elaborated in Cambodia, SKY has the status of a GRET 
project. Nevertheless, it is structured like a non-proit company, 
employing more than one hundred people in the back ofice and 
on the ield. An information management system was set up 
(currently using Access, soon using My SQL) to track enroll-
ment and health care consumption in detail and thereby pro-
gressively establish a basis on which to evaluate illness inci-
dence risks, and produce monthly reports. In addition, short 
studies are conducted yearly on subscribers’ satisfaction, care-
seeking behaviour, drop out rates, SKY’s notoriety and image, 
etc. Furthermore, client relations are monitored closely through 
regular village meetings, extended contact with SKY staff as-
signed to health care facilities, a complaints monitoring hot 
line, and exit surveys of beneiciaries following hospital care. 
Finally, SKY employs reference physicians who specialise in 
relations with partner health facilities and monitoring the qual-
ity of care and service provided. The project’s approximately 
ten years of experience and ten technical assistance missions by the 
SKY team to other micro health insurance systems in Cambodia 
have progressively made it possible to clarify the situation of 
and potential for micro health insurance in the country.
2.2 Research Methods
This article is based on all of the data from the SKY project’s 
information management system over a ive-year period 
starting once the intervention methodology had been stabi-
lised. The data includes the number of subscriptions, the 
amount of health care consumed, the capitation payments to 
health care facilities, real expenditure by health facilities, etc.
In addition to this system, four in-house studies were 
conducted.
First, two quantitative studies were conducted: in July 2007 
surveying 216 households in Ang Roka District, Takeo Province 
(21% of the insured population in the district) (Barbier, Miart, 
2007); and in August 2008 surveying 108 households in Kam-
pong Thom District, Kampong Thom Province (33% of the 
insured population in the district) (Goursat, 2008). The aim of 
these studies was to obtain feedback from the insured on the 
relevance of the service provided. These took the form of 
semi-guided interviews about the interviewees’ health seeking 
behaviours. They were conducted by Khmer investigators 
trained specially for these surveys. The interviewees were se-
lected at random from the list of insured people.
In addition, a study to assess subscriber satisfaction in the 
districts of Kampong Thom, Kampot and Koh Thom was 
conducted. It surveyed 279 households in July 2008 (Gour-
sat, Portejoie, 2008). The semi-guided interview technique 
was used for this survey as well. The questions focused on 
how the insured viewed the service provided and the system’s 
organisation. This survey was also conducted by Khmer in-
vestigators, and the interviewees were chosen at random.
Finally, a survey of SKY staff assigned to 23 health care 
centres in three operational districts (Ang Roka, Koh Thom, 
and Kampot) was conducted by SEGA/DOMREI, an inde-
pendent organisation, in October 2008 (Levine et al., 2008). 
Semi-guided interviews were conducted on the changes seen 
by SKY staff since SKY had begun its activities in the region.
3 Results: Gret’s Experience Coordinating 
 Micro-Insurance And Public Health Care
3.1 GRET’s Approach
GRET has been conducting rural development projects in 
Cambodia since the end of the 1980s. In 1991, the association 
launched a microinance programme which today has be-
come a legally acknowledged and inancially independent 
institution named AMRET.3 This experience showed GRET 
that a health insurance product would be relevant to protect 
poor rural households against severe health expenses, as a 
complement to micro-credit (a high proportion of non reim-
bursement of loans was due to health problems in the house-
hold). For this reason, GRET began developing a micro 
health insurance scheme, SKY, in 1998. 
3.1.1 An Experimental Approach
Several questions need to be answered when designing a 
health insurance product. In addition to the type of coverage 
offered (small risks, hospitalisation, payment of transporta-
tion costs), one of the major issues is the choice of provider 
for the covered services or, in other words, the health care 
supply that will be selected as partner. In order to evaluate 
which coverage system was most effective, GRET tested two 
health insurance schemes in two areas near the capital, Phnom 
Penh (Poursat, 2004): 
– An insurance system that included the provision of pri-
mary care in Kandal Province (a physician was hired as 
part of the insurance team). This model was justiied by 
 2SKY patients with TB or HIV/AIDS are referred to national 
programs, which already cover all treatment fees.  3A word of Sanskrit origin meaning prosperity, longevity and happiness.
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the lack of a public health care centre and the presence 
of private practitioners without degrees whose practic-
es were unsatisfying and expensive. This test, conduct-
ed from 1998 to 2004, was able to cover the health care 
needs of 680 people.
– An insurance scheme for hospital care in Takeo Prov-
ince, in partnership with the health care providers in the 
area. The area was chosen because of the presence of a 
quality hospital with clear and moderate fees that was 
supported by outside institutions (Swiss Red Cross, 
French overseas aid). This experiment, which ran from 
2000 to 2004, covered 800 people.
The primary advantages identiied for the irst scenario 
were as follows: service quality, control of supply, the in-
sured’s satisfaction with the physician’s availability, preven-
tive care. However, the limited hours for the physician’s pres-
ence (a problem for night time emergencies and weekends 
that could not be staffed), the tension generated with private 
practitioners who refused to provide the insured with care, 
the relatively limited scope of the care covered, and the cost 
of the service for the insurance scheme showed the limits of 
this type of system. A new dimension was added to the debate 
in 2000 when a public health care centre was built in one of 
the communes where the scheme was active. The question of 
competition between the insurance scheme and public health 
care emerged sharply. GRET therefore opted to coordinate its 
project with the Ministry of Health’s policy and establish a 
partnership with the new health care centre.
3.1.2 Stabilising Contractual Relationships
The second scenario tested was to establish a contractual 
relationship with a public hospital. This is the scenario cur-
rently in operation. The mechanism used is capitation, that 
is to say a lat-rate payment calculated per insured person 
based on the average incidence of illnesses and cost of 
treatment, paid at the start of the month to the health facil-
ity. Any positive or negative balance at the end of the month 
remains with the health care facility, which thereby carries 
the inancial risk.
In practice, while capitation is included in the contracts be-
tween GRET and the public hospital, a support process was 
set up via a reimbursement of excess costs during the irst 
year of the contract in order to progressively build a reliable 
database on the incidence of illnesses and allow the hospital 
staff to become familiar with the capitation logic. In addition, 
the need to supply care providers with appropriate inancial 
incentives and control costs is taken into account when calcu-
lating capitation payment amounts.
In exchange, under the terms of the contract, the hospital 
must commit to meeting quality criteria for services and care 
(constant availability of essential medications, presence of 
minimum staff during the night, compliance with interven-
tion protocols, etc.). These criteria were aligned with those 
set by the Cambodian Ministry of Health as part of its internal 
assessment of health care facilities. In the contract with the 
insurance scheme, a inancial sanction is stipulated for re-
peated failure to fulil these criteria.
This type of partnership was later extended to primary 
health care through a speciic calculation of capitation 
amounts and similar contracts. A mandatory referencing sys-
tem is currently in place between the different levels of care, 
and a third-party payer system is in place for hospital care. 
Today, SKY has contractual relationships with ifty-ive 
health care centres, ten referral hospitals and ive provincial 
or national hospitals. 
In this model, micro insurance emerges as both a tool to 
foster utilisation of public primary health care and a means to 
lift inancial obstacles to access to hospital care that, even 
subsidised, remains dificultly attainable for the vast majority 
of the population.
3.1.3 The Authorities’ Necessary Involvement
The success of this partnership between SKY and public 
health facilities required a strong involvement on the part of 
the authorities at various levels of government. Very early on 
in the process, regular discussions were held with all levels of 
the Cambodian hierarchy: health facility staff and managers, 
and representatives of the Ministry of Health at decentralised 
(district, province) and central (secretaries of state, technical 
managers) levels. Seminars, presentations, meetings, work-
shops and individual interviews were held. 
The support of the Ministry of Health at the central level 
and of NGOs working in the ield of health, and the real i-
nancial dificulties of primary health care centres, had a deci-
sive role in overcoming the resistance of some health staff 
more accustomed to user fees or even fees for services than to 
micro-insurance services as they were developed by SKY. 
When roadblocks were encountered at the “intermediary” 
levels of the decentralised health administration (operational 
district, health facility managers), the Ministry of Health’s 
direct support was crucial.
To obtain this institutional support, the project worked si-
multaneously with the Cambodian government and the coun-
try’s main health actors (working group on insurance, short 
training courses, etc.) to develop Cambodia’s health policy. 
In this way, the project contributed to the elaboration of the 
country’s health policy.
3.2 The Project’s Impact on Public Health Care
3.2.1 Increased Utilisation of Public Health Care
As mentioned in regards to methodology, GRET conduct-
ed two surveys of its subscribers’ health seeking behav-
iours in 2007 and 2008, one in Ang Roka (Barbier and Mi-
art, 2007) and the other in Kampong Thom (Goursat, 
2008). These two districts show major differences in the 
amount of time insurance has been available since the 
SKY project was developed in Ang Roka as early as 2000 
and only starting in 2007 in Kampong Thom. They also 
differ in the quality of available health care, deemed good 
in Ang Roka (Lefait, 2005) and mediocre in Kampong 
Thom because of a lack of staff and equipment (Briasco 
and Sophat, 2006). In these two areas, the irst recourses in 
response to illness are as follows:
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Table 2. Location of First Health Contact.
First Health Contact
 Kampong Thom Ang Rok
Self-Medication 42% 4%
Public Health Care Facilities 33% 69%
Private Practitioners 11% 24%
Traditional Therapists 11% 
None 3% 
Other 0% 3%
TOTAL 100% 100%
Health Behaviour Survey, First Health Care Contact Place, 
Kampong Thom June 2008, Takeo July 2007
In both districts, recourse to public health care is higher 
than the national average of 21% (National Institute of Public 
Health and National Institute of Statistics Cambodia, 2006), 
reaching 33% in Kampong Thom and 69% in Ang Roka. By 
offering direct coverage by the health care centre or hospital, 
insurance helps redirect patient lows towards these structures 
and away from self-medication and private practitioners.
Quality of public health care facilities is the key factor to 
understand the behaviour of patients. Whereas subscribers 
who do not use public health care facilities in Kampong 
Thom deplore the poor quality of the service (42% of re-
sponses), emphasising out of stock medications and the lim-
ited skills of health care staff (Goursat, 2008), Ang Roka’s 
subscribers deem the quality of care good and easily go to 
public structures to be cured (69% of irst contacts). In both 
cases, the perception of quality of the insured people corrob-
orates the outside assessment of the objective quality of 
health care (Lefait, 2005; Briasco and Sophat, 2006).
The success of public health care can also be measured by 
the attendance rate of health care centres. In the centres work-
ing with the project, the average contact rates were 3.6 visits 
per person per year in 2006, 3.2 in 2007, and 2.1 in 2008, 
showing much higher attendance than the national contact 
rate of less than one visit per person per year and a good con-
trol of over-consumption. 
Thus, SKY’s private micro health insurance seems able to 
increase attendance in public health care centres. For this 
trend to persist, it must be supported by an improvement in 
the quality of the services offered.
3.2.2 An Improvement in the Perceived Quality  
of Health Care
The service quality criteria set contractually in the SKY proj-
ect have progressively been met by the public health care 
centres and hospitals: longer opening hours, night time and 
weekend emergency on-call staff, presence of all staff in the 
morning at least (and two people less in afternoons), regular 
supply of basic medications, etc.
The survey of SKY staff (member facilitators) with ofice 
hours in the twenty-three health care centres (Levine et al., 
2008; see methodology II.2) gave the following results in re-
gards to practical changes in the centres:
 Overall, the situation seems to have improved since SKY 
began operations for all criteria, mainly dealing with per-
ceived quality and service quality (staff politeness). In addi-
tion, the satisfaction surveys among SKY members (Goursat, 
2008) indicate a good level of perceived quality. Seventy-ive 
percent of subscribers surveyed in Kampong Thom believe 
that they receive better treatment than non-subscribers (Gour-
sat, Portejoie, 2008). Moreover, satisfaction rates are high: 
92% of those interviewed expressed overall satisfaction with 
the service, and around 90% were satisied with the behav-
iour of medical staff, waiting times, and the health care cen-
tres’ diagnoses.
3.2.3 Better Financial Anticipation Capabilities
Health care facilities’ inancial anticipation has improved. 
The insurance revenues paid at the start of the month by SKY 
to the health facility are more stable than revenues from user 
fees (which would seem to follow cost curves) and are on 
average higher than costs evaluated on the basis of user fees 
(by 15% in hospitals and by 33% in health care centres, in 
2006 and 2007). The system allows public health facilities to 
smooth out their activity, invest in new equipment, and fa-
cilitate cash low management (on time payment of perma-
nent staff salaries, etc.).
The igure showing health revenue and expenses for the 
Ang Roka District referral hospital —a facility treating large 
risks— is particularly eloquent (Figure 1). Capitation reve-
nue paid by SKY is higher than health costs and more pre-
Table 3. Changes in Health Care Centre Conditions Since SKY Began Operations
 Improved Same Worse
Measure HCCs %HCs HCCs %HCs HCCs %HCs
Waiting Time 15 65% 8 35% 0 0%
Cleanliness 14 61% 9 39% 0 0%
Staff Politeness 18 78% 4 17% 1 4%
Doctor’s Service 15 65% 7 30% 1 44%
Staff Absenteeism 13 57% 10 43% 0 0%
 Note: Number of observation = 23. HCCs: Health Care Centres
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dictable than user fees. Only in the case of an epidemic like 
the one between January and July 2007, health care expenses 
may exceed capitation revenue. Overall, capitation revenue 
gives to the health facility management more latitude to man-
age its structure than do user fees.
This effect has a tendency to intensify as the share of capi-
tation in overall revenue increases for a health facility. Today, 
SKY can account for up to 30% of the revenue of health care 
centres and up to 25% of the revenue of referral hospitals.
4 Discussion: To What Extent Does Non Profit 
 Private Micro Health Insurance Help Improve 
 Public Health Care?
The progressive adjustment of the statistics used to calculate 
capitation payment amounts made it possible to improve the 
attractiveness of this mechanism for public health institu-
tions. Its effects on attendance, inancial predictability and 
improved quality became progressively stronger for public 
health care. Capitation has become the contractual mecha-
nism recommended by the Cambodia Ministry of Health in 
its national guidelines for community-based health insurance 
(Cambodia Ministry of Health, 2006).
However, setting off a virtuous circle such as this involves 
a learning curve for both health facility staff and patients.
4.1 The Need for Health Care Management Capacity
In regards to staff, capitation generates a managerial logic that 
is very different from traditional modes of cost reimburse-
ment. It notably requires strict control of over-consumption 
and over-prescription. The ability to rationalise health staff 
behaviour and optimise management of capitation payments 
– or in other words, ability to manage the facility – is a deci-
sive factor in the partnership’s success. The reform initiated in 
1994 by the government of Cambodia to ensure the progres-
sive decentralisation of health care management gives greater 
responsibility to the operational districts (ODs, each made up 
of health care centres and a referral hospital), as emphasised 
in the Health Strategic Plan 2008-2015. Various initiatives 
have been taken to improve managerial capacities in the ODs, 
such as internal or external contracting with specialised 
NGOs. Because of this, GRET works in priority with health 
facilities that receive outside technical support (from GTZ in 
Kampong Thom and Koh Thom, and from SRC in Ang Roka). 
Establishing consistent quality criteria between the in-house 
technical assistant (GTZ, SRC) and the external insurer client 
(SKY), deining more transparent management standards for 
the regular reporting of accounts to institutional partners, and 
the proper in-house use of additional revenues are as many 
factors that foster the success of capitation. As mentioned by 
Akashi et al. (2004), in the case of the introduction of user 
fees, staff awareness is the key to the effective implementa-
tion of the scheme.
4.2 Health Education Difficulties
Another hindrance to good synergy between private insurance 
and public health care lies in the population’s habits of self-med-
ication and multiple consultations. These practices are dificult to 
eliminate. Patients know the market price of medications and 
attempt to negotiate with care providers the treatment of their 
illnesses as a function of the amount of money they have and 
their perception of the care needed in the very short term. This 
attitude is encouraged by the situation of public health care 
workers who cannot live on their state salaries alone as their only 
source of income (US$30 to US$40 per month, whereas the min-
imum necessary income is estimated at US$120). In this situa-
tion, it is very tempting to give in to patients’ demands for treat-
ment, and charge as much as possible for services and the 
medication that patients cannot buy over the counter in pharma-
cies. This affects the quality of care provided. As De la Seiglière 
(1999) summarised: “Patients and professionals maintain a rela-
tionship that is harmful to patients’ health and inancial capital, 
but that satisies them both in the short term.” By offering month-
ly salary supplements indexed on attendance, capitation slows 
the development of these parallel private practices.
Another related aspect deals with the perception of patients 
of the quality of the care they receive. A study in 2001 em-
phasised that the patients’ strong demand for injectable medi-
cations was leading to the perception that SKY did not pro-
vide adequate care. A positive view by the public of SKY’s 
products was key to growth. However, SKY could not pro-
vide dangerous coverage and therefore education on this is-
sue needed to continue (McCord, 2001).
In all cases, the work accompanying and monitoring pa-
tients is crucial. The proximity of SKY staff in health care 
centres and the mobilisation of an advising physician allows 
for closer dialogue with insured people and ongoing aware-
ness raising on better health practices.
4.3 Finance Health Care or Make Households  
More Secure?
Until now, the Ministry of Health has emphasised micro 
health insurance in the aim of diversifying inancing for the 
health care system, notably through direct inancial participa-
tion by households. 
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Figure 1. Capitation Revenue and Health Expenses for the 
referral hospital in Ang Roka District
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The SKY project has one point in common with this ap-
proach: selecting capitation-based partnerships for primary care 
makes it possible to ensure a certain degree of cost recovery for 
health care facilities. However, the project’s primary objective 
differs from the Ministry’s ambitions: the goal is not primarily 
to make the public health care system proitable, but to preserve 
household budgets. The positive impact on health facilities and 
the quality of care is, in some way, a hoped-for trickle-down ef-
fect and not a goal in its own right. The logical framework of the 
intervention is thus out of step with the government’s aims.
Thus, deciding to build a partnership with the public health 
care system is a deliberate choice on GRET’s part. Indeed, to 
offer access to quality care, it could be entirely acceptable for 
an insurer to work with the private sector if the latter is more 
effective than the public sector and charges fees that are ac-
ceptable for the insured. A strong national policy geared to-
wards improving the quality of public health care is therefore 
absolutely necessary for health insurance schemes such as the 
one developed by the SKY project to be able to function.
5 CONCLUSIONS
What is the take-home message from this analysis? Based on 
GRET’s micro health insurance project in Cambodia, the aim 
was to determine the extent to which non-proit private micro 
health insurance can help improve public health care.
We have seen that by taking an experimental, progressive 
approach, the SKY micro health insurance programme 
implemented by GRET in agreement with the national au-
thorities has enabled an increased utilisation of public 
health care, an improved perception of the quality of care, 
and better inancial anticipation abilities by both health 
facilities and the insured. However, the limitations of and 
obstacles facing such systems are numerous as self-medi-
cation among the insured persists, the attitude of poorly 
paid health care workers does not favour rational use of 
medicines, and the orientation of Ministerial inancing for 
health care is not always consistent with the project’s ob-
jectives. Ultimately, the synergies between non-proit pri-
vate micro health insurance and public health care will be 
more effective when insurance accounts for a large share of 
health care facilities’ revenues – that is to say when the sub-
scriber base is large. 
Today, the challenge is to go beyond the current project and 
take into account the poorest populations that do not have 
access to the micro health insurance system. A partnership 
between GRET and a Health Equity Fund to attain this is cur-
rently being tested in Kampot Province. The SKY premiums 
of very inancially disadvantaged individuals are paid by the 
subsidy fund (implemented by the Ministry of Health, with 
support from GTZ, AusAid and World Bank), providing these 
individuals with free access to health care. This link between 
a Health Equity Fund and the insurance scheme promises to 
increase the scheme’s leverage, triggering more quickly and 
more strongly the virtuous circle between non-proit private 
insurance and public health care.
Appendix: Map of SKY Intervention Zones
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